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                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                            DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                    Plaintiff,
                                   )
                                      Case No. 2:16-cr-046-GMN-PAL
 6
               vs.
                                     Las Vegas, Nevada
  CLIVEN D. BUNDY (1),
                                      Monday, January 8, 2018
   RYAN C. BUNDY (2),
                                   )
                                      Courtroom 7C, 9:28 a.m.
   AMMON E. BUNDY (3),
   RYAN W. PAYNE (4),
                                      MOTION TO DISMISS
                  Defendants.
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                                      CERTIFIED COPY
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                         TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
                 BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLORIA M. NAVARRO
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                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT CHIEF JUDGE
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     APPEARANCES:
     For the Plaintiff:
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16
               UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
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                    NADIA JANJUA AHMED
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               Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
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     (Appearances continued on Page 2)
22
     Court reporter: Heather K. Newman, RPR, CRR, CCR #774
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                      Las Vegas, NV 89101
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     Proceedings reported by machine shorthand, transcript produced
     by computer-aided transcription.
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     APPEARANCES CONTINUED:
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               RYAN C. BUNDY, PRO SE
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     APPEARANCES CONTINUED:
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 3
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               BY: MARGARET A. McLETCHIE
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               Las Vegas, NV 89101
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                (702) 728-5300
 6
     Also present:
 7
                Sharon Gavin, FBI Special Agent
                Joel Willis, FBI Special Agent
               Mike Abercrombie, FBI Special Agent
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 9
               Mamie Ott, Legal Assistant
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               Nicole Reitz, IT
               Brian Glynn, IT
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4 1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA; MONDAY, JANUARY 8, 2018; 9:28 A.M. 2 --000--3 PROCEEDINGS COURTROOM ADMINISTRATOR: All rise. 4 5 THE COURT: Thank you. You may be seated. 6 COURTROOM ADMINISTRATOR: This is the time set for 7 the Motion Hearing regarding Documents No. 2883 and 2906, sealed Motions to Dismiss and Document No. 3010, Motion to 8 9 Unseal Intervenors -- by Intervenors in Case Number 10 2:16-cr-046-GMN-PAL, United States of America vs. Cliven Bundy, 11 Ryan Bundy, Ammon Bundy, and Ryan Payne. Counsel, please make your appearances for the record. 12 13 MR. MYHRE: Good morning, Your Honor. Steve Myhre, 14 Dan Schiess, Nadia Ahmed on behalf of the United States. 15 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Schiess. Good morning, 16 Ms. Ahmed, and good morning, Mr. Myhre. MR. WHIPPLE: Good morning, Your Honor. 17 18 Brett Whipple -- as well Happy New Year to you. Brett Whipple 19 on behalf of Mr. Cliven Bundy. 20 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Whipple, Mr. Bundy. 21 PRO SE RYAN BUNDY: Ryan C. of the Bundy family here 22 by special appearance with Maysoun Fletcher assisting and on --23 and for the record, I reserve all right. 24 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Bundy. Good morning, 25 Ms. Fletcher.

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               MR. HILL: Good morning and Happy New Year,
     Your Honor. Dan Hill along with Morgan Philpot here on behalf
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     of Ammon Bundy.
               THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Hill, Mr. Philpot and
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     Mr. Bundy.
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               MS. WEKSLER: Good morning, Your Honor.
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     Brenda Weksler and Ryan Norwood on behalf of Mr. Payne.
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               THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Weksler, Mr. Norwood,
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     and good morning, Mr. Payne.
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               So before we begin, I would like to make some
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     preliminary remarks just to --
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               MS. McLETCHIE: Good morning, Your Honor.
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     Maggie McLetchie --
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               THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry.
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               MS. McLETCHIE: -- for the Intervenors Las Vegas
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     Review Journal and Battle Born Media.
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               THE COURT: Thank you. Good morning, Ms. McLetchie.
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               All right. So before we begin, I just wanted to make
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     some preliminary remarks to remind everyone and to set clear
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     the expectations of how court will be conducted this morning.
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               Please remember this is a courtroom; it is not a
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     sporting event. So it is never appropriate to make any
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     expression of your opinion, whether verbally or through your
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     body language, no matter how much you may agree or disagree
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     with what is being said.
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In addition, we do not allow electronic devices in the courtroom. There is no audio or video recording permitted in the courtroom. Therefore, only the attorneys are permitted to have electronic devices so that they may be able to do their job. There is one paralegal -- I think I see him back there -- who is permitted to have an electronic device so long as the audio and speaker is covered.

Do you have that with you today, sir?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I kept it in my briefcase,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir.

So please be aware that the marshals are authorized to remove any individual who is seen with an electronic device, whether it's on or off. Whether it's in vibrate or privacy mode, does not matter. If you have the device, they will be able to remove you and you may not be able to re-enter. Likewise, if you make any distracting or inappropriate expressions, the marshals also have the authority to remove you in order to preserve the atmosphere in the courtroom.

Now, the Court has reviewed the following briefs:

Number 83 -- I'm sorry -- 2883 is the sealed version. The

public version is 3057. The Court has also reviewed Docket No.

2906. The public version of that is 3058. And the Court has also reviewed Documents 3082 and 3085. The public versions of those documents are 3087 and 3088.

The Court does grant Cliven Bundy's Motion for Joinder, which is Number 3096.

Now, in Payne's Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Payne's Motion to Dismiss, which is Number 3085, he does request that the Indictment be dismissed based on three possible theories:

The first being that the case barred by the double jeopardy clause; the second being that outrageous government conduct that amounts to a due process violation justifies dismissal; and the third theory is that dismissal under the Court's supervisory power for outrageous governmental misconduct is appropriate.

The Court first will address the double jeopardy argument.

Double jeopardy does attach once a jury has been sworn. Pursuant to *United States v. Alexander*, Ninth Circuit case decided in 1998, "If a case is dismissed after jeopardy attaches but before the jury reaches a verdict, a defendant may be tried again for the same crime only in two circumstances: Number one, if he consents to the dismissal, or number two, if the district court determines that the dismissal was required by manifest necessity," quoting from *Chapman*, Ninth Circuit case decided in 2008 as well as *Oregon v. Kennedy*, United States Supreme Court case decided in 1982. Here, the Court has already granted the mistrial based on manifest necessity so it follows that the defendants may be retried under this theory.

However, defendant Payne argues that the Double

Jeopardy Clause still bars retrial "where the government

conduct in question is intended to 'goad' the defendant into

moving for a mistrial," quoting Oregon v. Kennedy. Considering

what has occurred throughout the trial up to this point, the

Court finds no evidence that the government's failure to

disclose evidence was a strategy decision on the prosecution's

part to abort the trial. Rather, it appears the government has

attempted to provide the defense with the identified Brady

evidence in order to move forward with trial and not to

purposely goad the defense into moving for mistrial.

For these reasons, the Court finds the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial.

Next we have the claim of outrageous government conduct and that a dismissal is appropriate for either — either under a due process violation theory or under the Court's supervisory powers.

"A district court may dismiss an Indictment on the ground of outrageous government conduct if the conduct amounts to due process violation," quoting from Simpson, Ninth Circuit case. If the conduct does not rise to the level of a due process violation, the Court may nonetheless dismiss a case for outrageous government misconduct under its supervisory powers.

So turning first to the due process violation allegation.

To violate due process, governmental conduct must be, and I quote, "so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice," quoting from *United States v. Restrepo*, Ninth Circuit case decided in '91, and also *United States vs. Ramirez*, Supreme Court case decided in 1983.

Due process is not violated unless the conduct is attributable to and directed by the government, *United States* v. Barrera-Moreno, Ninth Circuit case decided in 1991.

"Outrageous government conduct occurs when the actions of law enforcement officers or informants are so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction," United States v. Archie, which is 2016 case out of the District of Nevada as well as United States v. Black, Ninth Circuit case decided in 2013 and United States v. Russell, U.S. Supreme Court case decided in 1973.

Now, dismissal under this "extremely high" standard is appropriate only in "extreme cases in which the government's conduct violates fundamental fairness," *U.S. v. Pedrin*,

P-e-d-r-i-n, Ninth Circuit case decided in 2015 quoting from *United States v. Smith*, Ninth Circuit decided in 1991.

So when reviewing a claim alleging that the Indictment should be dismissed because the government's conduct was outrageous, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government, *United States v. Gurolla*, G-u-r-o-l-l-a,

Ninth Circuit case decided 2003.

The concept of outrageous government conduct focuses on the government's actions, *United States v. Restrepo*.

Here in this case, both the prosecution and the investigative agencies are equally responsible for the failure to produce *Brady* materials to the defense. In the prior mistrial hearing, the Court explained, in detail, that numerous documents, and the information contained in such documents, should have been provided to the defense and the Court finds this conduct especially egregious because the government chose not to provide this evidence, even after the defense specifically requested it.

The Court finds the prosecution's representations that it was unaware of the materiality of the Brady evidence is grossly shocking. The prosecution was on notice after the Court's order, which is on the docket, Number 2770, that a self-defense theory may become relevant if the defense was able to provide an offer of proof, outside the presence of the jury. Moreover, in that same order, Number 2770, the Court specifically denied the government's motion to exclude all the reference to perceived government misconduct to the extent it is relevant to defenses raised by the defendants. So the government was well aware that theories of self-defense, provocation, and intimidation might become relevant if the defense could provide a sufficient offer of proof to the Court.

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However, the prosecution denied the defense its opportunity to provide favorable evidence to support their theories as a result of the government's withholding of evidence and this amounts to a *Brady* violation.

For example, the government claims it failed to disclose this evidence because the FBI did not provide the documents to the prosecution team. However, the prosecutor has a duty to learn of favorable evidence known to other government agents, including the police, if those persons were involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case, citing Kyles v. Whitley, United States Supreme Court case decided 1995. Clearly, the FBI was involved in the prosecution of this case. Based on the prosecution's failure to look for evidence outside of that provided by the FBI and the FBI's failure to provide evidence that is potentially exculpatory to the prosecution for discovery purposes, the Court finds that a universal sense of justice has been violated. The Court is convinced that there is still outstanding Brady discovery based on the government's most recent assertion that, and I quote, "the government expects a thorough review of the discovery will result in the production of other documents to the defense, " and I'm citing from the most recent filing by the government, Number 3081, Page 45, Footnote 20.

Alternatively, a district court may exercise its supervisory powers in three different enumerated ways:

Number one, "to remedy unconstitutional or statutory violation"; number two, "to protect judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before a jury"; or number three, "to deter future illegal conduct," quoting from Simpson, Ninth Circuit case decided '91.

In United States vs. W. R. Grace, the Ninth Circuit

In *United States vs. W. R. Grace*, the Ninth Circuit clarified that the exercise of the Court's inherent powers is not limited to these three grounds enumerated in *Simpson*, and that was an en banc decision by the Ninth Circuit in 2008.

"Dismissal is appropriate when the investigatory or prosecutorial process has violated a federal Constitution or statutory right and no lesser remedial action is available," quoting from Barrera-Moreno.

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that exercise of a supervisory power is an appropriate means of policing ethical misconduct by prosecutors, *United States v. Lopez*, Ninth Circuit case decided in 1993.

So "dismissal under the Court's supervisory powers for prosecutorial misconduct requires both:

"Number one, flagrant misbehavior, and number two, substantial prejudice," citing *United States v. Kearns*, K-e-a-r-n-s, Ninth Circuit case decided in 1993.

Neither accidental nor mere negligent governmental conduct is sufficient. The idea of prejudice entails that the

government's conduct had at least some impact on the verdict and thus redounded to the defendant's prejudice.

In order for the Court to dismiss an Indictment under the supervisory powers, the Court must find that there has been flagrant prosecutorial misconduct, substantial prejudice to the defendants, and that no lesser remedial action is available.

The Court found previously that there had been multiple Brady violations because the government failed to produce evidence that bolstered the defense and was useful to rebut the government's theory. Additionally, the Court concluded that the government willfully failed to disclose potentially exculpatory, favorable and material information, including, but not limited to, the following documents and their contents:

The FBI Law Enforcement Operation order; the FBI
Burke 302 about Agent Egbert; the FBI 302 about BLM Agent
Delmolino authored by FBI Agent Willis; the FBI 302 about BLM
Special Agent Felix observing the LP/OP, the Listening
Post/Operation Post; the FBI 302 about BLM Racker and his
assignment to the LP/OP; the unredacted FBI TOC log; and the
various threat assessments created by different agencies,
including the BLM and FBI.

It seems no coincidence that most, if not all, of these documents are authored by the FBI.

I do need to make one correction. Apparently I

previously identified -- or should I say misidentified -- a report or some information as being contained in an Internal Affairs report. It was actually in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force report, the JTTF prepared on March 14th of 2014. This is the document that recorded that at a meeting Love had stated that he had requested that the FBI place a surveillance camera.

So the Court looks to Chapman, U.S. v. Chapman. And in Chapman, the district court dismissed an Indictment pursuant to its supervisory powers based on discovery violations that involved 650 pages of undisclosed documents that the Court classified as Brady material. The district court in Chapman found that "the Assistant U.S. Attorney acted flagrantly, willfully and in bad faith" and that he had made "affirmative misrepresentations to the Court," that the defendants would be prejudiced by a new trial and that no lesser standard would adequately remedy the harm done after reviewing the totality of the proceedings before it.

The Ninth Circuit held that the *Chapman* court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the Indictment pursuant to its supervisory powers.

Here, defendant Payne argues that the government's conduct was more egregious than the facts before the *Chapman* court. He argues that there were more than mere hints of the discovery issues on the eve of trial and that there was at

least a thousand pages of discovery disclosed between

November 8th and December 15th of 2017, all which should have
been disclosed by October 1st.

The government argues that this case is different from the Chapman case because here the prosecution did not fail to produce evidence it knew to be material. The government contends it merely inadvertently failed to disclose evidence, or that the defense had all the information in the undisclosed documents because the government had previously provided other documents with substantially the same content. Further, the government contends that the documents that the Court ruled to be untimely disclosed, in violation of Brady, not including the OIG reports, is actually fewer than 200 pages.

"The prosecutor has a 'sworn duty' to assure that the defendant has a fair and impartial trial. His interest in a particular case is not necessarily to win, but to do justice," citing from Chapman. Here, the prosecution seems to have minimized the extent of prosecutorial misconduct by arguing that they believed the various items previously undisclosed, like the threat assessments, were not helpful or exculpatory, or that they did not need to be -- or that they did not provide evidence that snipers had been inserted or did not need to, because the use of snipers was already known to the defense. Another argument is that the FBI did not provide the information to the prosecution.

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The Court acknowledges that merely negligent government conduct is not sufficient to establish flagrant misbehavior. However, as the appellate court in Chapman stated, "we never suggested that flagrant misbehavior does not embrace reckless disregard for the prosecution's constitutional obligations." In other words, reckless disregard may amount to flagrant misbehavior. As the Court has noted, a prosecutor has an ongoing duty to learn of favorable evidence known to other government agents, including the police, if those persons are involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case. Therefore, the fact that the prosecution failed to look beyond the files provided by the FBI is not mere negligence; it is a reckless disregard for its Constitution obligations to learn and seek out favorable evidence. The prosecution's reliance on the FBI to provide the required information amounted to an intentional abdication of its responsibility.

For example, the prosecution was aware of the existence of a camera set to provide a live feed. The claims that the FBI 302 authored by Burke on April 8th of 2014 about Egbert led the prosecution to believe that it did not need to follow up on the camera feed because the 302 report said that the camera was not configured to record. But the prosecution's decision to not follow up was not mere negligence. As the Court noted previously, the government's proffer that views from a surveillance camera were never viewed by anyone nor

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recorded or reported in some format was simply inconceivable. That the prosecution accepted this implausible claim, whether it was provided by the FBI, is just another example of its reckless disregard to fulfill its constitutional duties to learn about evidence favorable to the defense that may have existed as a result of someone's notes and observations of the surveillance camera's live feed of the Bundy Ranch.

Further, the prosecutors' alleged reliance on the information in the FBI files was misplaced. The Court finds that the FBI's failure to timely produce information to the prosecution amounts to reckless disregard or flagrant misbehavior, especially in light of the fact that the FBI was directly involved in the operation, prior to the operation, during, and after the alleged conspiracy timeline. The Court seriously questions why the FBI inexplicably placed (or perhaps hid) potentially exculpatory electronic information about the placement of FBI snipers in such an unconventional location, on a thumb drive, inside a vehicle, for over three years. Compounding the Court's concern is that the FBI had almost four full years to prepare the trial and two years to disclose the information to the prosecution and that their agents were physically present during the last two trials where the existence of snipers was contentiously debated. Regardless, the Court is not required to identify the responsible persons with such specificity. And I add, the Court is not aware of

any other situation where the FBI has acted in disregard such as this. The law attributes, nevertheless, the conduct, whether it's of the FBI or other enforcement -- law enforcement agencies under these circumstances, to the government prosecution team, citing *United States vs. Barrera-Moreno* decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1991, analyzing the Court's supervisory power, stating, and I quote, that "dismissal is appropriate when the investigatory or prosecutorial process has violated a federal constitutional or statutory right and no lesser remedial action is available."

This case is distinguished from Chapman in that the prosecution in this case has kept a record of what has been produced and what has not been produced. The Court also recognizes that the government has attempted to locate all outstanding discovery. However, like Chapman, this case involves voluminous discovery and the government willfully failed to produce Brady material. Additionally, the government made several misrepresentations to the defense, and to the Court, regarding the existence of the cameras, the snipers, the materiality of prior threat assessments and its diligent and fully complying -- its diligence in fully complying with its constitutional obligations. For example, representations about whether individuals were technically "snipers" or not "snipers" was disingenuous, especially considering that the undisclosed documents authored by the FBI, the ones located on the thumb

drive inside a vehicle, expressly refer to these individuals as "snipers" at least three different occasions. Likewise, arguments about whether they were actually "deployed" or merely "training" was a deliberate attempt to mislead and to obscure the truth. These are arguments for closing argument and not a reason to withhold information. Numerous other instances are noted by the defense in the brief and the Court does not disagree with these representations.

Thus, the Court does find that there has been flagrant prosecutorial misconduct in this case even if the documents themselves were not intentionally withheld from the defense.

Defendant Payne argues that the defense has been prejudiced because there -- they have already set forth the legal and factual particulars of their defense by revealing voir dire strategy, the evidence they expect to support their defense in their opening statements, revealing their strategy in cross-examination, and the defense correctly avers that this revealed information will allow the government to try and correct its faltering case. Specifically, the defense notes the lack of success of the government at prior trials; the tone and the direction of the jury questions in this case, both those questions that were read and not read to the witness; and the new yet unexplored issues related to the Wooten e-mail, the FBI special agent who was formally assigned to lead the

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investigation but abruptly was removed in February of 2017, allegedly by the prosecution because he complained of Special Agent in Charge Dan Love's misconduct, the investigating law enforcement officer's bias, the government's bias, and the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.

The Court agrees that retrying the case would only advantage the government by allowing them to strengthen their witnesses' testimony based on the knowledge gained from the information provided by the defense and revealed thus far. The government would be able to perfect its opening statements based on the revealed defense strategy in its opening and the government would also be able to conduct more strategic voir dire at the retrial.

The Court is troubled by the prosecution's failure to look beyond the FBI file that was provided and construes the Brady violations in concert as a reckless disregard of its discovery obligations. The government's recklessness and the prejudice the defendants will suffer as a result of a retrial warrant the extreme measure of dismissing the Indictment because no lesser sanction would adequately defer -- deter future investigatory and prosecutorial misconduct.

The government is only proposed a new trial as the appropriate remedy for their discovery violations. However, its conduct has caused the integrity of a future trial and any resulting conviction to be even more questionable. Both the

defense and the community possess the right to expect a fair process with a reliable conclusion. Therefore, it is the Court's position that none of the alternative sanctions available are as certain to impress the government with the Court's resoluteness in holding prosecutors and their investigative agencies to the ethical standards which regulate the legal profession as a whole.

The Court finds that the government's conduct in this case was indeed outrageous, amounting to a due process violation, and that a new trial is not an adequate sanction for this due process violation.

Even if the government's conduct did not rise to the level of a due process violation, the Court would nonetheless dismiss under its supervisory powers because there has been flagrant misconduct, substantial prejudice, and no lesser remedy is sufficient. Dismissal is necessary as to these four defendants: Ryan Payne, Ryan Bundy, Ammon Bundy, and Cliven Bundy, and dismissal is justified for all three of the enumerated reasons provided by the law:

Number one, to properly remedy the constitutional violation; number two, to protect judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests only on appropriate considerations validly before a jury; and number three, to deter future illegal conduct.

It is herein ordered that the defendants' Motion to

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Dismiss with prejudice, Number 2883, public version 3057, as
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     well as Document No. 2906, public version 3058, and
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     Document 3082 and 3085, public version 3087 and 3088, are
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     hereby granted.
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               The Court hereby vacates the detention orders for
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     Cliven Bundy. The Court vacates the pretrial release orders
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     and exonerates the bonds of Ryan Payne, Ryan Bundy, and Ammon
     Bundy. Mr. Payne is still to report to the U.S. Marshal's
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     Office immediately per Judge Brown's order from Oregon, but
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     rather than having you remanded into custody right now
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     immediately, I will order you to report to the U.S. Marshal's
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     Office as soon as this hearing is concluded.
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               The Calendar Call in trial date is likewise vacated
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     as to these four defendants, and the trial for the remaining
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     defendants will remain scheduled for February 26th at 8:30 a.m.
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     with Calendar Call February 15th at 9:00 a.m.
               So the Court will take about a 15-minute recess.
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     It's 9:56 now. So, about until 10:15 so that the proper
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     paperwork can be provided to the defendants and then we'll
     resume and take up the Intervenors' Motion to Unseal, which is
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     number 3010 on the docket.
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               COURTROOM ADMINISTRATOR: All rise.
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               Off record.
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        (Recess was taken at 9:56 a.m.)
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                        COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
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               I, <u>Heather K. Newman</u>, Official Court Reporter, United
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     States District Court, District of Nevada, Las Vegas, Nevada,
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     do hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28,
 7
     United States Code, the foregoing is a true, complete, and
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     correct transcript of the proceedings had in connection with
 9
     the above-entitled matter.
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     DATED: 1-9-2018
                                  /s/ Heather K. Newman
                             Heather K. Newman, CCR #774
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                             OFFICIAL FEDERAL REPORTER
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